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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

Case No. 20070135-CA

v.
KIMBERLY SHEA HAVATONE

:

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from third-degree felony
convictions pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Issue I: Did the trial court err in violation of evidence rules 402-404 by admitting
the defendant's statement that she committed forgery?
Standard of Review: Challenges to evidence rulings are reviewed for abuse of
discretion. State v. Decorso, 993 P.2d 837, 843 (Utah 1999). '"Notwithstanding error by
the trial court, we will not reverse a conviction if we find that the error was harmless.'"
State v. Rhinehart, 2006 UT App 517,128, 153 P.3d 830 (quoting State v. Calliham,
2002 UT 86,% 45, 55 P.3d 573). "An error is harmless when it is 'sufficiently
inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected
the outcome of proceedings.'" Id. (quoting State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, \ 10 n.l, 994
P.2d 1237).

Preservation: The defendant objected to admission of both the statement about
committing forgery, as well as mentioning that the arrest warrant issued upon forgery
charges, pursuant to rules 401-404, during pretrial proceedings. R. 119:5-6. In the
alternative, admission of either mention of forgery constitutes plain error.
Issue II: Did the trial court err in violation of evidence rules 402 and 403 by
admitting testimony that the defendant was initially arrested on forgery charges?
Standard of Review: Challenges to evidence rulings are reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Decorso, 993 P.2d at 843. "' Notwithstanding error by the trial court, we will
not reverse a conviction if we find that the error was harmless.5" Rhinehart, 2006 UT
App 517 at If 28 (quoting State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86 at Tf 45). "An error is harmless
when it is 'sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood
that the error affected the outcome of proceedings.5" Id. (quoting Loose, 2000 UT 11 at ^f
lOn.l).
Preservation: The defendant objected to admission of both the statement about
committing forgery, as well as mentioning that the arrest warrant issued upon forgery
charges, pursuant to rules 401-404, during pretrial proceedings. R. 119:5-6. In the
alternative, admission of either mention of forgery constitutes plain error.
Issue III: Did the court err in violation of evidence rule 609 by allowing the
defendant to be cross-examined as to details of a prior forgery conviction, the statutory
elements of the crime of forgery, and that forgery was a crime of dishonesty.
Standard of Review: "'The test for harmless error in cases involving an
erroneous failure to exclude prior convictions is whether, absent the error, there was a
2

reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for defendant.'" State v. Cravens, 2000
UT App 344, If 13, 15 P.3d 635 (quoting State v. Lanier, 778 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah 1989)).
Preservation: Defense counsel objected to the cross-examination of the
defendant as to the statutory elements of forgery. R. 119:197-98. The court overruled
the objection and authorized the prosecutor to ask more "questions" in pursuit of this line
of inquiry. R. 119:198. In the alternative, allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine the
defendant as to the statutory elements of forgery and whether it constitutes a crime of
dishonest constitutes plain error.
Issue IV: Did prosecutorial misconduct occur when, during rebuttal, he
disparaged defense counsel's integrity, stated that the defendant committed bad acts that
were not supported by evidence in the record, and asserted that because the defendant
was "lying" when she committed forgery, she also was "lying" when she first denied
drug possession and requested a drug test.
Standard of Review: Prosecutorial misconduct is reviewed for abuse of
discretion, and requires reversal where
the actions or remarks of [prosecuting] counsel call to the attention of the
jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in determining its
verdict and, if so, under the circumstances of the particular case, whether the
error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood
that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result. . . .
State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (alteration and ellipsis in
original) (quoting State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)).
Preservation: To the extent the prosecution's impermissible statements brought
to the jurors' attention matters that should not have figured into their deliberations
3

because they constituted irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, or inadmissible character
evidence, the statements were preserved for appellate review by defense counsel's
objections noted supra, Issues MIL See R. 119:5-6, 197-98. In the alternative, the
misconduct constituted plain error.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2006) (amended by 2007 Utah Laws Ch. 374
HB 231) is attached as Addendum B.
Utah R. Evid. 402, 403, 404 and 609 are attached as Addendum C.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant was charged by information with one count of unlawful possession
of a controlled substance, a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2006). R. 1-2. The defendant was bound over for trial following a
preliminary hearing. R. 27-28. Following a one-day jury trial, the defendant was
convicted as charged. R. 89. On February 5, 2007, the defendant was sentenced to 0-5
years in the Utah State Prison. R. 101-102. The prison sentence was suspended, and 36
months probation, including sixty days in jail, was imposed. Id. The sentencing minutes
(R. 101-102) are attached as Addendum A. The Notice of Appeal was filed on February
8, 2007. The parties stipulated to one 30-day extension for the filing of the defendant's
opening brief, which now is due June 6, 2007.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The evidence in general. Only two witnesses testified - the arresting officer and
the defendant. See R. 119 (trial transcript). The arresting officer confronted the
4

defendant at her hotel and placed her under arrest based upon an outstanding forgery
warrant. R. 119:130-32. The defendant was wearing the oversized t-shirt in which she
slept when the officer arrived at the hotel. R. 119:195. The officer allowed the defendant
to put on clothes before handcuffing her. R. 119:148-49, 195-96. The officer handcuffed
the defendant so that her hands were restrained in back. R. 119:149-50. The officer
searched the coat defendant would wear outside, and he performed a pat-down search of
the defendant. R. 119:132-33. Nothing of mention was discovered. See R. 119:133-34.
Still cuffed in back, the defendant was placed in the back seat of the officer's
patrol car and was further restrained by a standard combination seatbelt and shoulder
harness. R. 119:152-53. While handcuffs are "inherently uncomfortable," they become
even more so when a person cuffed in back is forced to sit down and lean back. R.
119:150. The seat cushion in the back of the officer's patrol car causes a passenger to
lean back against the seat. R. 119:179-80.
When an arrestee is placed in the back seat, the arresting officer typically monitors
the arrestee's movement through the rearview mirror while he is driving. R. 119:158-59.
It was the arresting officer's "habit... to keep an eye on folks in the backseat" of his
patrol car. R. 119:141. In this case, it was snowing when the officer drove the defendant
to jail. Id. While he was driving to the jail, the officer did not observe the defendant
"doing anything suspicious," "wiggling or struggling," or "trying to do anything evasive
as far as her hands go or her body movements." R. 119:159.
The backseat of the patrol car consists of a standard bench on which sits a cushion.
R. 119:109, 122-23. The bench is level, sloping neither forward nor backward. R.
5

119:179. The officer testified that he always lifts the seat cushion after transporting a
prisoner to search for any contraband the prisoner may have attempted to leave behind.
R. 119:124. The officer, however, did not bother to remove "old debris" and "foliage"
that also collected under the seat cushion. R. 119:157.
At the jail, the officer told the defendant to get out of the car. R. 119:135. The
officer lifted the seat cushion and brought out a small amount, or a "twist," of
methamphetamine. Id. He testified that the drug was found "almost directly in the
middle" of the seat cushion, not to side where the defendant was belted and handcuffed.
R. 119:154.
According to the officer, when he showed the "twist" to the defendant, the
defendant said, "I did a forgery but I don't do drugs, you can test me." R. 119:142.
The defendant denied possessing, or "know[ing] anything about that
methamphetamine." R. 119:196.
Admission of statement regarding an unrelated crime because it was relevant
to "context'' and because it was a statement against interest. The day before trial, the
parties' counsel agreed the state could mention that the defendant was arrested pursuant
to a warrant, but that anything regarding forgery was not important. According to the
prosecutor, "I told Mr. Tan that the fact that it was a forgery warrant is not especially
important to me, that I didn't have a problem instructing my police officer to refer to the
warrant just as an arrest warrant and not a warrant for a forgery." R. 119:2-3.
On the morning of trial, however, the state indicated that it wanted to bring in the
defendant's statement made when the officer accused the defendant of stashing a "twist"
6

of methamphetamine in the patrol car. R. 119:3. At that time, the defendant said she
committed the forgery, but never possessed drugs. Id. She also requested a drug test. Id.
Defense counsel objected to mentioning the warrant was issued on forgery charges
and to admission of the defendant's statement about forgery pursuant to rules 401 and
402, Utah R. Evid., noting that the defendant was on trial for one charge - drug
possession - and was not on trial for anything involving a charge of forgery. R. 119:5.
Counsel noted that the defense to constructive possession of drugs bore no relation to
"forgery or anything related to the forgery case." Id.
Defense counsel also objected pursuant to rule 403 because reference to a forgery
charge caused unfair prejudice insofar as a juror is likely to believe that "history repeats
itself, she's probably a habitual criminal, if she committed the forgery, she most likely
was in possession of the drugs." R. 119:6.
Defense counsel also objected to any statement offered by the arresting officer that
"forgery and drugs go hand in hand" because no other evidence would corroborate such a
claim. R. 119:6.
Defense counsel also objected pursuant to rules 404 and 608, claiming that where
as here forgery has nothing to do with the drug possession charge, the only possible effect
of mentioning forgery would be to damage the defendant's character and credibility. R.
119:7.
Defense counsel explained that, until this point, the defendant had not been
planning to testify precisely because were she to do so it might open the door to mention
of the forgery charge. R. 119:7.
7

The state argued that the defendant's statement about committing forgery "is
absolutely relevant because the underlying contact between the police officer and the
defendant was a warrant for forgery." R. 119:8. It argued that the defendant's statement
about committing forgery should "come in as a conversation that the officer had with the
defendant in furtherance of his investigation (inaudible)." Id.
Defense counsel queried what possible purpose for mentioning forgery existed if
not to convince the jury that the defendant needed money, a need that flowed from drug
use. R. 119:9. Counsel repeated his concern that the forgery evidence was being offered
to establish the defendant's criminal character. Id.
The court ruled that the officer could testify the arrest warrant was issued on
forgery charges because the mention of forgery was relevant to "context." R. 119:10.
The court ruled that while the officer might testify that it was a "forgery arrest," he
should not make "any connection between forgery and drugs. . . . I think it is allowable
that it be referred to as a forgery arrest warrant but no other connection otherwise. Is that
clear?" R. 119:13; ^ee id. (responding to the court's question, the state responded, "Yes
absolutely. I'll make sure that that happens.")
The court ruled the declaration was admissible as a statement against interest
being offered by the state:
And just for the record and my ruling just to be clear is the denial was that
she owned the drugs. The admission that I'm allowing to come in was that
she has been convicted of a forgery charge and that's why I'm allowing the
forgery charge to come in because she admitted to the officer as a prior
statement^] . . . [I]t's just that I'm allowing that in because it was a
statement that the defendant made against her interest that's being offered
by the State. That's why I'm allowing it to come in.
8

R. 119:14.
In addressing defendant's rule 401 and 402 relevance objections, the court
explained that the statement about the forgery arrest warrant is "certainly relevant
because it offers context[.]" R. 119:15. Regarding unfair prejudice, the court explained
that because the officer already intended to mention an arrest warrant, simply clarifying
that the warrant related to forgery would cause no further prejudice. Id. As for the
defendant's declaration about forgery, the court identified no fact of consequence to
which it related; but rather repeated that the declaration is admissible as a statement
against interest. Id.
As to the prejudicial relevant issues that are raised by 404, 401, 402, all of
the other things that were argued, I am finding that because information was
going to come in that there was an arrest warrant, that that was the police
contact and that is appropriately coming in. The fact that it was a bench
warrant or an arrest warrant for forgery is not so much more prejudicial that
it's certainly relevant because it offers context and it is not so much more
prejudicial that it substantially outweighs the probative purpose for it. So I
am ruling on the other arguments that have been made as to prejudice and
probativeness but I'm allowing it to come in because the defendant made a
statement against her interest[.]
R. 119:14-15.
Mention and use of "forgery" at trial. Following opening statements, defense
counsel informed the court that he was not sure whether the defendant would testify. R.
119:96. Counsel explained that the decision would depend upon how much testimony
there was about forgery:
I believe it's going to come down to how much of Officer Malley's
testimony will be in regards to the forgery issue and based on what I was
able to find out, if in fact there is going to be testimony to the extent or to
9

what extent that's going to come in, I may have no other alternative than to
put Ms. Havatone on the stand to try to explain further to the jury and we'll
have to play that by ear.
R. 119:96.
The officer testified that arrest warrant issued on forgery charges:
The State: Do you remember the purpose of that warrant?
Officer Malley: Forgery.
R. 119:132.
The officer testified that when he confronted the defendant with the
methamphetamine he found in the back of the patrol car, "she told me,' I did a forgery
but I don't do drugs, you can test me.'" R. 119:142. The officer did not testify that the
forgery related to the defendant's motive or plan to possess a controlled substance. See
id.
Following the officer's testimony, the defendant was called to testify. R. 119:192.
When asked by defense counsel about the forgery warrant, the defendant testified, "I pled
guilty to a forgery that I committed and I took the responsibility for that." R. 119:193-94.
She then testified that she "told Officer Malley that I did commit the forgery and that I
didn't have anything to do with the drugs that he found in his car." R. 119:194. The
defendant did not testify to her reputation regarding honesty, nor did she go into any
more details about the prior forgery conviction. See id.
On cross-examination, the defendant admitted to pleading guilty to a forgery
charge earlier that year. R. 219:196-97. The state then examined the defendant as to the

10

actual elements of forgery, reading the definition of elements from Utah Code Ann. § 766-501(a) (2003) (except to add "she"):
And just so that I'm clear and (inaudible) forgery, real quick so forgery is
something that somebody is guilty of, with the purpose to defraud anyone or
with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he
or she alters a writing of another without his authority or other such altered
writing or makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers,
publishes or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion,
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance
purports to the act of another, whether the person is existent or non-existent,
what purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered
sequence other than what's in the (inaudible) case or to be a copy of an
original when no such original existed. That's what a forgery is, right?
R. 119:197.
The defendant objected to the relevance of the elements of forgery given that the
only issue properly before the court was the defendant's culpability for possessing an
illegal substance. R. 119:197.
The state argued that the "door was opened to discussion along these lines." R.
119:198. It argued that the term "forgery" is "amorphous," and, "I think it's important
for everybody in the court to be clear so that we're all on the same page in terms of what
we're talking about." Id.
The court overruled the defendant's objection. R. 119:198.
The defendant answered that those were the elements of forgery. R. 119:198.
The state continued beyond definition of "forgery," asking, "So this is a situation
that involves someone's honesty, doesn't it?" R. 119:198.
The defendant replied, "Yes." R. 119:198.

11

In closing argument rebuttal, the state declared that defense counsel's argument
about forgery not being at issue was an attempt to mislead the jury; and that, in his
personal opinion, the defendant was "lying" when she first denied possessing drugs and
requested a drug test precisely because she "lied" when she committed forgery:
I want to talk to you about the conflicts of the evidence today because you
heard from one person from the prosecution's side and one person from the
defense's side and the defense in his closing argument made a pretty big
deal about the fact that the defendant had been convicted of forgery, wanted
to bring that to your attention and make sure that you're clear on the fact
that there's no forgery charge today. Why do you think that is, ladies and
gentlemen? Think about that for a second. Why was he so insistent about
that? I'll tell you why, he wants to divert your attention away from the fact
that the defendant has a conviction for lying, for dishonesty, for forgery,
passing bad checks. You heard the definition of what a forgery is. I'm not
here to tell you that the defendant is a bad person. I'm not trying to tell you
that. What I am here to tell you is that you have to weigh the statements of
two separate people. When you go back to the jury room you should believe
what Officer Malley told you. Officer Malley is the more credible witness
in this case. Did the defendant say the drugs didn't belong to her? Yeah.
She said it on January 27th, did [sic] take responsibility for them then and
didn't take responsibility for them today. The defense would lead you to
believe that because she admitted to the forgery, what she was saying about
the drugs was also true. That to me is very strange, ladies and gentlemen,
because she admits to lying about something, having lied in the past and
then wants you to believe that she's not lying on that day. Don't be fooled
by this. Don't be fooled.
R. 119:241-42.
Summary of Argument
Point I:

The court abused its discretion in allowing the officer to repeat the

defendant's declaration that she had committed forgery. Especially after the court ruled
that the officer could not connect forgery with drugs, her concession was not relevant to
any fact of consequence. Evidence of a prior conviction that is not properly admitted per

12

the limitations of evidence rule 404(b) or 609 is presumed prejudicial. The prosecutor
wanted the statement to come in for the sole purpose of impugning the defendant's
character, as evidenced by his argument during rebuttal that the defendant was
"dishonest[ ]" and "lying" when she committed forgery, therefore she "lied" when she
admitted committing forgery but denied doing drugs and requested a drug test.
Point II:

The court abused its discretion when it permitted the officer to

testify that the defendant's initial arrest occurred pursuant to a warrant issued on forgery
charges. Again, that the defendant was wanted for, or may have committed forgery was
not relevant to any fact of consequence. Labeling her a forger was unfairly prejudicial.
The court's ruling that mention of forgery should come in as "context," was error because
even context must relate in some way to the crime for which the defendant is standing
trial. In this case, forgery bore no relation to constructive possession of drugs or the
defense thereto.
Point III:

The court abused its discretion overruling the defendant's objection

to the prosecutor's cross-examination of the defendant on the elements of forgery, and
that forgery involves dishonesty. Rule 609 permits introduction of certain prior
convictions for the sole purpose of impeaching the defendant's credibility as a witness.
Absent circumstances not relevant to this case, rule 609 only permits inquiry into the
prior conviction's nature, date and sentence. The prosecutor exceeded these bounds
when the court allowed him to question the defendant about the elements of forgery.
Such questioning was even more prejudicial than going into the actual details of the
crime (which also is impermissible) because it left the jury to speculate how many of the
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different statutory ways to commit forgery the defendant engaged in. This error became
evident when, during rebuttal, the prosecutor transformed impeachment evidence into
substantive character evidence by arguing that because the defendant was "lying" when
she committed forgery, she also "lied" when she initially denied involvement with drugs
and requested a drug test.
Point IV:

The prosecutor committed misconduct when transformed

impeachment evidence into unabashed character evidence by arguing that because the
defendant was "lying" when she committed forgery, she also "lied" when she initially
denied involvement with drugs. Moreover, the prosecutor impermissibly attacked
defense counsel's integrity, and attributed criminal acts to the defendant that were
unsupported by any evidence adduced at trial.
Point V:

Whether considered individually or together, these errors may not be

dismissed as harmless.
ARGUMENT
. The court erred in allowing the officer to testify about the defendant's irrelevant
statement that she committed forgery and that she was initially arrested for forgery, and
also in overruling the defendant's objection to being cross-examined regarding details of
the forgery conviction. These errors facilitated the prosecutor's misconduct in wielding
the forgery as substantive character evidence. Especially because the evidence in this
case was close, this improper use of bad act evidence may not be dismissed as harmless.
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In this case, the state initially conceded that no reason existed for mentioning
forgery. R. 119:2-3. The prosecutor told the court that "the fact that it was a forgery
warrant is not especially important to [the prosecution]." R. 119:3.
Just minutes prior to jury selection, however, the prosecutor informed the court
that it wanted the officer to explain that the arrest warrant issued on a forgery charge. R.
119:3. He had only recently re-read the officer's report and noticed the defendant's
statement that, when first shown the substance recovered from the patrol car's backseat,
she may have committed forgery, but did not possess drugs. Id. The prosecutor said he
wanted the officer to recount the defendant's statement as part of the conversation in
which the officer told the defendant that, in his experience, forgery and drug use go handin-hand. Id.
The court excluded the officer's opinion about the relation between forgery and
drugs because it was too prejudicial, and because it would constitute inadmissible expert
opinion testimony. R. 119:12. Despite eliminating the only basis proffered for admitting
the statement, the court ruled that the officer could repeat the defendant's statement, and
also that the defendant was initially arrested for forgery. E.g., R. 119:10-11, 13, 14-15.
As detailed below, these erroneous pretrial rulings affected the course of the entire
trial, through closing arguments when the prosecutor used bad act evidence to brand the
defendant as a liar when she committed the forgery, and thus a liar when she initially
denied possessing drugs.
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POINT I:

THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE ARRESTING OFFICER
TO REPEAT THE DEFENDANT'S OUT-OF-COURT
DECLARATION ABOUT COMMITTING FORGERY.

The court abused its discretion in allowing the arresting officer to repeat the
defendant's declaration that she committed forgery because it constitutes inadmissible
character evidence (Sec. A), and it erred as a matter of law in concluding that committing
forgery did not constitute a bad act pursuant to rule 404(b) (Sec. B).1
A.

The Defendant's Statement that She May Have Committed Forgery but Not
Drug Possession Constitutes Inadmissible Character Evidence.
This is a case about constructive drug possession, based entirely upon

circumstantial evidence. See R. 119:7 (trial court's summation of the case during pretrial
proceedings), 214 (the state in closing argument conceding the absence of direct
evidence). The state initially sought to justify admission of the defendant's statement that
she committed forgery through the officer's testimony because it intended to link forgery
and drug use through the officer's testimony. R. 119:3. The prosecutor explained that
when Ms. Havatone is taken out of the police car and the drugs are found,
the police officer confronts Ms. Havatone about the drugs and says it's my
experience that forgery and drugs are sometimes related and so (inaudible)
in addition to some other factors, I think (inaudible) belong to you. Ms.
Havatone replied to the police officer said [sic] I did the forgery but these
aren't my drugs.

This brief draws from interpretations of the federal rules of evidence. Where, as here,
the state rules at issue are substantively identical to their federal counterparts, such
reliance is appropriate. See State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, ^f 30 n.l, 52 P.3d 1194
("Although the Federal Rules of Evidence are a separate body of law from the Utah Rules
of Evidence, if the reasoning of a federal case interpreting or applying a federal
evidentiary rule is cogent and logical, we may freely look to that case, absent a Utah case
directly on point, when we interpret or apply an analogous Utah evidentiary rule."), cert,
denied, 537 U.S. 1123(2003).
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R. 119:3.
The court ruled the officer could not testify to any such link. R. 119:12. Even so,
and without identifying any other fact of possible consequence for which the statement
was probative, the court admitted the declaration about forgery as a statement against
interest. E.g., R. 119:14 (ruling the statement admissible "because it was a statement that
the defendant made against her interest that's being offered by the state"). In so doing,
the court abused its discretion.
Evidence of prior criminal activity is presumed prejudicial because of "the
tendency of a fact finder to convict the accused because of bad character rather than
because he is shown to be guilty of the offenses charged." State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d
738, 741 (Utah 1985), abrogated on other grounds, State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484, 489
(Utah 1997). The Court in Doporto expressly recognized a presumption against
admissibility of testimony regarding past criminal history:
For the reasons stated by Dean Wigmore, the prejudice that can flow from
admitting evidence of other crimes committed by a defendant can be
unusually prejudicial, raising acute concerns of fundamental fairness arising
from the real possibility that the defendant will be convicted for his
presumed bad character rather than his acts.
Doporto, 935 P.2d at 489 (citing 1 Wigmore on Evidence § 58.2, at 1212 (Tillers rev. ed.
1983)). See State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("Generally, inquiry
into the details of prior convictions has been found to be so prejudicial as to amount to
plain error").

Following the 1998 amendment of rule 404(b), the Court called into question its
Doporto ruling that required "very limited deference" to a trial court's admission of bad
17

1. The state introduced the forgery statement to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. "Evidence of a person's
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion[.]" Utah R. Evid. 404(a). In particular, bad
act testimony is not admissible for the purpose of proving character: "Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith." Utah R. Evid. 404(b).
In this case, when the court ruled the officer could not link forgery and drugs, any
relevance of the forgery statement as foundation or "context" for said link was eliminated.
The state, however, then urged its admission as an "inconsistent statement": "I mean, it's
an inconsistent statement there, Judge. It's admitting one thing but not admitting to
another thing.... It's the inconsistency there that I'm seeking to bring in." R. 119:10.

act evidence. State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57 *h 16, 993 P.2d 837. The 1998 amendment to
rule 404(b) clarified that evidence of other crimes and bad acts is admissible if they are
relevant to a non-character purpose spelled out in rule 404(b), and they meet the
relevancy requirements of rules 402 and 403. The Court declared a return to the preDoporto standard for admission of bad act evidence " i f its proponent sought admission
pursuant to rule 404(b), noting that "under the traditional application of 404(b), prior to
Doporto, there was no presumption against the admission of other crimes evidence if ii
was being offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose." Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at \ 24
(emphasis added). Rule 404(b) was amended again in 2000, deleting the 1998 changes
upon which the Court in Decorso relied in partially overruling Doporto, Utah R. Evid.
404, Adv. Comm. Note. The advisory committee, however, directed that the 2000
amendment was not intended to "reinstate the holding of State v. Doporto" nor was it
intended to lessen the requirement that evidence admitted pursuant to rule 404(b) "also
conform with Rules 402 and 403 to be admissible." Id, As the following analysis makes
clear, Doporto's "very limited deference" standard remains applicable in this case
because the state offered no basis for the forgery statement's admission under 404(b), and
the court identified no such basis for its ruling.
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Unclear is what recognized basis for admission the prosecutor was invoking by the
reference to this so-called inconsistency. Admissibility is not established merely because
a statement about committing forgery but not possessing drugs might in some sense be
"inconsistent." Compare Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) (excepting from rules against
hearsay cross-examination of a declarant at hearing or trial concerning a prior statement
by declarant that is inconsistent with current testimony).
Any uncertainty as to the state's actual purpose for introducing the statement was
dispelled during its rebuttal argument on close. The prosecutor expressly declared that by
committing forgery, the defendant established herself as a liar, and she was acting in
conformity therewith when she subsequently told the arresting officer that she did not use
drugs and wanted to be tested for drugs:
I'll tell you why [defense counsel urged the jury to focus on the possession
charge, not the forgery conviction], he wants to divert your attention away
from the fact that the defendant has a conviction for lying, for dishonesty,
for forgery, passing bad checks. . . . The defense would lead you to believe
that because she admitted to the forgery, what she was saying about the
drugs was also true. That to me is very strange, ladies and gentlemen,
because she admits to lying about something, having lied in the past and
then wants you to believe that she }s not lying on that day. Don't be fooled
by this. Don't be fooled.
R. 119:242 (emphasis added). (This and other incidents of prosecutorial misconduct are
addressed infra, Point IV.)
The italicized portion of the foregoing quote is exactly what Rule 404 prohibits.

The rule 404(a)(1) exception to the character evidence ban does not apply in this case.
That rule states in pertinent part: "Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same" may be admissible. Utah R. Evid.
404(a)(1). In this case, the defendant offered no evidence going to her truthful character;
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2. The statement was not admitted to prove any exception to the rule against
bad act evidence set forth in rule 404(b). Testimony about bad acts may be admissible
as substantive evidence for purposes other than proving character, such as establishing
"motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake[.]" Utah R. Evid. 404(b). Proper admission of bad act evidence under rule
404(b) requires a three-part determination.
First, "the proponent must demonstrate that the evidence is actually being offered
for a proper, noncharacter purpose, such as those specifically listed in [rule 404(b)].55
Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at \ 21 (emphasis added). In this case, the prosecutor first sought
admission of the forgery declaration as part of the conversation in which the officer
connected forgery with drug use. R. 119:3. When the court prohibited any testimony
aimed at establishing such a relationship, the prosecutor sought admission because, in his
words, "[I]t5s an inconsistent statement there, Judge. It's admitting one thing but not
admitting to another thing. . . . It5s the inconsistency there that I'm seeking to bring in.55
R. 119:10. This alleged inconsistency does not pertain to any of the noncharacter reasons
for admitting bad act evidence identified in rule 404(b). This fails the first step of the
Decorso analysis.
Second, the court "must determine . . . whether such evidence meets the
requirements of rule 402[.]55 Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at \ 21. Rule 402 forbids admission
of evidence that is not relevant. Rule 401, in turn, defines relevancy as follows:

and, therefore, provided no evidence for the state to rebut. (The prosecutor's argument to
the contrary is addressed infra, Point IV.)
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"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Utah R.Evid. 401.
"Implicit in that definition [of relevancy] are two distinct requirements: (1) The
evidence must be probative of the proposition it is offered to prove, and (2) the
proposition to be proved must be one that is of consequence to the determination of the
action." United States v. Hall, 653 F.2d 1002, 1005 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing McCormick
on Evidence § 185, at 435 (2d ed. 1972); 1 Weinstein 's Evidence Tf 401(03), at 401-13
(1980); 22 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5162, at 18
(1978)).
A proposition "is of consequence," only if it is "part of the hypothesis governing
the case[.]" Hall, 653 F.2d at 1005. In a criminal case, the "governing hypothesis . . .
consists of elements of the offense charged and any relevant defenses raised to defeat
criminal liability." United States v. Lamberty, 778 F.2d 59, 60-61 (1st Cir. 1985) (citing
Hall at 1005).
In this case, the court identified nothing related to the elements of drug possession
or the defendant's defense thereto that pertained to a concession regarding forgery.
Without even addressing relevancy, the court admitted the statement merely because "it
is appropriate that the jury get the context of how this arrest occurred and how the
conversation occurred":
This case is simple and straight forward. That while the defendant was
being arrested on another charge there were drugs found in the nearby
vicinity and the whole issue is whether or not the drugs were hers and the
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jury needs to have the context of that. I am going to allow the statement of
the defendant to come in. I agree that it is an inconsistent statement and is
being offered by the opposing party for the purpose of going against Ms.
Havatone. . . . [Bjottom line is that this was an inconsistent statement and
that Ms. Havatone did make admissions to the officer, whether it be about
the possession of the drugs or admissions about other crimes, it was still an
admission that she made and under those circumstances, I think it is
appropriate that the jury get the context of how this arrest occurred and how
the conversation occurred.
R. 119:10-11.
The court's ruling fails to acknowledge rule 402's proscription of irrelevant
evidence. To the contrary, the court effectively declared that so long as a statement
constitutes an admission, especially if there is something inconsistent about it, the
statement is admissible independent of relevancy. The court's failure to identify how the
concession was relevant fails the second step of the Decorso analysis.
Third, "the court must determine whether the other crimes evidence meets the
requirements of Rule 403." Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at U 23. Rule 403 provides in pertinent
part that even relevant evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations[.]" Utah R. Evid. 403.
The court employed circular reasoning to overrule the defendant's rule 403
objection to the forgery statement. The court reasoned that no unfair prejudice flows
from admitting the forgery statement because a forgery warrant will already have been
mentioned; and no unfair prejudice results from mentioning the forgery warrant because it
provides context for the forgery statement. See R. 119:14-15.
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Lost in this ruling is not only that the forgery statement is irrelevant to any fact of
consequence, but also that evidence of another crime is presumed prejudicial.
Saunders, 699 P.2d at 741, Doporto, 935 P.2d at 489.
Moreover, the prosecution's rebuttal argument based upon the forgery statement
caused "confusion of the issues" and "mis[led] the jury." Utah R. Evid. 403. In State v.
Ernmett, the state cross-examined the defendant regarding bad acts, thus eliciting
impeachment evidence in compliance with rule 609. 839 P.2d 781, 786 & n.15 (Utah
1992). During closing argument, however, the prosecutor wielded the impeachment
evidence as substantive character evidence, arguing that because the defendant had
previously exploited a family member, he was acting in conformity therewith when he
abused the victim of the crime then at issue. Id. The Court declared that while the crossexamination may have been proper, the prosecutor crossed the line when he used the
impeachment evidence as substantive character evidence. Id. at n.15 ("However, this
statement [by the defendant that he previously exploited a family member] does not open
the door for the prosecution to use the past conviction substantively."). Because the prior
bad acts were irrelevant to any fact of context, the Court determined that the prosecutor
committed plain error in violation of rule 404. Id.
In this case, defense counsel attempted to focus the jury's attention on the
possession charge and away from the forgery. R. 119:238 ("I would ask that you focus
on . . . whether or not she was in possession of the methamphetamine. This is not a case
about forgery[.]"). In response, the prosecutor first accused defense counsel of attempting
to mislead the jury: "I'll tell you why [defense counsel emphasized "that there's no
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forgery charge today"], he wants to divert your attention away from the fact that the
defendant has a conviction for lying, for dishonesty, for forgery, passing bad checks." R.
119:241-42. (The prosecutor's mention of bad checks where there existed no evidence
thereof is addressed infra, Point IV.) More significantly, regardless of the guise in which
the forgery evidence was admitted, the prosecutor in this case impermissibly crossed the
same line drawn in Emmett when he used the evidence of forgery to declare the defendant
was "lying" when confronted with the drugs: "[S]he admits to lying about something,
having lied in the past and then wants you to believe that she's not lying on that day." Id.
In so doing, the prosecutor took the forgery evidence and transformed it into substantive
evidence of the defendant's supposed propensity for lying, thus violating the letter and
spirit of rule 404. This fails the third Decorso step.
The statement was admitted in violation of rule 404's ban on character evidence.
The statement did not meet any exception to this ban.4
B.

Committing Forgery Constitutes a Bad Act pursuant to Rule 404(b).
The court erred as a matter of law in concluding forgery is not a bad act subject to

the requirements of rule 404. Forgery is crime. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (2003).
Other courts have considered forgery in the context of rule 404(b). See e.g., State v.

4

For these same reasons, the court erred in concluding the statement was admissible as
an admission. Rule 801(d)(2)(A) effectively says that an admission by the defendant is
not hearsay. Even this hearsay rule, however, remains subject to the rules of relevancy:
To be admissible, a rule 801(d)(2)(A) admission must still pertain to a fact of
consequence. See Utah R. Evid. 402. "For statements to constitute admissions
[admissible pursuant to rule 801(d)(2)(A)] they need only relate to the offense." People
v. Ojeda, 758 F.2d 403, 408 (9th Cir. 1985). As detailed supra, Point I, § A, the so-called
forgery admission relates in no way to the drug possession charge.
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Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 58-59 (Utah 1993). Forgery is considered an act of dishonesty
subject to evidence rule 609(a)(2) ("evidence that any witness has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement [.]"). See e.g., State v.
McArthur, 2000 UT App 23, \ 8, 996 P.2d 555, cert, denied, 9 P.3d 170 (Utah 2000).
The trial court, however, dismissed rule 404 concerns, ruling instead that forgery
did qualify for the evidentiary restrictions on admission of bad act evidence because it
would come in as "context": "This is not so much admitting the prior bad acts and for the
purposes of showing any proper purpose under 401-4(b) or anything. It is simply putting
context for the jury as to the circumstances of this case." R. 119:10.
The prosecution's use of the statement during closing argument, however, defies
any such conclusion. See R. 119:242. The prosecutor focused on the forgery admission
and conviction to paint the defendant as a liar when she committed forgery, and therefore
as a liar when she denied drug use. Id. Thus the prosecutor used forgery as substantive
evidence of the defendant's allegedly dishonest character.
POINT II:

THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ALLOWING THE
OFFICER TO SAY THE DEFENDANT WAS ARRESTED FOR
FORGERY.

As noted above, relevant evidence is that which makes any fact of consequence
more or less probable. Utah R. Evid. 401. In a criminal case, facts of consequence are
those that relate to the "elements of the offense charged and any relevant defenses raised
to defeat criminal liability." Lamberty, 778 F.2d at 60-61 (citing Hall, 653 F.2d at 1005).
In this case, the court allowed the officer to testify that he arrested the defendant
on a forgery warrant because mention of a forgery arrest provided "context" for the
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officer's retelling of the defendant's statement that she committed forgery. E.g., R. 119:
10, 11, 15. This testimony was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial.
Mere "context," in and of itself, does not do away with rule 402's dictate that only
relevant evidence is admissible: "Relevancy must thus be determined in relation to the
charges and claims being tried, rather than in the context of defenses which might have
been raised but were not." United States v. Hedgepeth, 418 F.3d 411, 419 (4th Cir.
2005). In Hedgepeth, the defendant was a city councilwoman who was convicted for
conspiracy to extort, attempted extortion, and making false statements to federal officers.
The FBI's initial investigation focused upon a private party it suspected of illegally
seeking to influence city business. Id. at 414-15. The FBI sent a wired informant to talk
to the private party who, in turn, suggested the defendant might also be in the "kickback
business." Id. at 414-15. At trial, the prosecution sought admission of the private party's
statement about the defendant's participation in the "kickback business" to show (1) that
the FBI had not specifically targeted the defendant, but rather the private party, and (2)
the defendant's and private party's "conspiratorial mindset." Id. at 419. The trial court
admitted the statement for the purposes of context, "deem[ing] the Kickback Statement
admissible for the limited purpose of showing to the jury why [the private party] adopted
the course of action that he did here - in other words, why he chose to approach
Hedgepeth and offer her a bribe." Id. (quotations omitted).
The Court of Appeals, by contrast, construed the defendant's possible involvement
in the "kickback business" as testimony about a prior bad act, and held that "the FBI's
motive in investigating [the defendant] has not been shown to be probative of any
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element of the offenses for which she was being tried." Id. at 420. The court speculated
that had the defendant raised an entrapment defense (which she did not), the FBI's
motivation for investigating her might have been relevant. Id. It concluded that whatever
minimal relevance the conversation might possess was substantially outweighed by unfair
prejudice. Id. at 420-21; see id. at 421 (under the specific facts of this case, the error was
harmless).
In Lamberty, the defendant was a postal employee convicted of opening a package
that was not addressed to him. 778 F.2d at 60. Under direct examination by the
prosecution, a postal inspector testified that the defendant was initially targeted for
investigation based upon reports that he had previously opened other packages that were
not addressed to him. Id. These prior bad acts were offered to provide context about
why and how the government set up a trap to catch the defendant opening the package at
issue. JW. at 60-61. The Court of Appeals examined the elements of the charge. Id. at
61. It concluded that this bad act testimony was irrelevant and prejudicial, and justified
reversing the conviction:
We do not find that the evidence introduced to show the government's
motive in setting the trap is in any way relevant to proving the elements of
the counts charged. While the jurors may have been curious as to why the
inspectors began their operation, enlightenment on this matter had no
probative value.
Lamberty at 61.
These cases highlight the justifiable concern over irrelevant and prejudicial bad act
evidence being admitted under the guise of "context." In this case, the defendant's arrest
for forgery had no bearing upon the elements of the possession charge she then was
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facing. It had no bearing on the defendant's theory of the case: that the small amount of
methamphetamine found in the police care was not hers:
Q. Kimberly, you have heard testimony and have seen evidence
today in regards to that twist [of methamphetamine] over there. Does that
methamphetamine belong to you?
A. No.
Q. Do you know anything about that methamphetamine?
A. No.
R. 119:196.
"Context" has also been used to justify admitting testimony as foundation for
subsequent relevant testimony about the crime itself. See United States v. GarciaMorales, 382 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2004) (discussing whether drug trade provided context
for subsequent testimony about the defendant's involvement in a drug conspiracy). The
officer's testimony about the forgery warrant in this case was initially admitted to lay
foundation, or 1o provide context, for the officer's testimony about the defendant's
subsequent forgery statement. E.g.,R. 10. The officer's retelling of the defendant's
forgery statement, however, also was irrelevant and inadmissible. Supra, Point I. Absent
admission of the forgery declaration, even the state conceded that no reason existed to
say the defendant was arrested for forgery. R. 119:3. Thus admission of the officer's
testimony about the forgery warrant may not be justified as context or foundation for any
subsequent admissible testimony.
Finally, "context" has been used to justify testimony "Ho complete the story of the
crime on trial:" United States v. Sheffield, 992 F.2d 1164, 1170 (11th Cir. 1993)
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(emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Mills, 704 F.2d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1983)).
In this case, testimony that the defendant was initially arrested on some other charge was,
at most, minimally relevant to the subsequent drug possession charge. That the arrest
was for forgery bears no relation to the subsequent discovery of methamphetamine in the
officer's car.
Even if testimony telling the jury that an outstanding arrest warrant for forgery
was minimally relevant, it should have been excluded because its probative value was
outweighed by unfair prejudice: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury [.]" Utah R. Evid. 403. Rule 403 operates to keep
out evidence of minimal probative value "dragged in by the heels for the sake of its
prejudicial effect." United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir. 1979). "As to
such, Rule 403 is meant to relax the iron rule of relevance, to permit the trial judge to
preserve the fairness of the proceedings by exclusion despite its relevance." Id.
As noted above, testimony that the defendant was arrested for forgery bears no
relation to either the elements of drug possession, nor to any defense actually raised. The
forgery declaration for which it supposedly provided context should never have been
admitted. Supra, Point I. Apropos, therefore, is the McRae court's observation about the
function of rule 403 to prevent evidence of minimal value being dragged in primarily for
prejudicial effect.
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POINT III: THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE STATE TO CROSS
EXAMINE THE DEFENDANT AS TO THE DETAILS OF HER
FORGERY CONVICTION.
The trial court erred in allowing the state to cross-examine the defendant as to the
details of her forgery conviction that went beyond its nature, date and punishment.
Rule 609 permits introduction of evidence of certain crimes including forgery for
impeachment purposes. Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1). The use of such evidence is strictly
restricted to impeachment, and for good reason:
[A] Rule 609(a) inquiry should be limited to the nature of the crime, the date
of the conviction and the punishment. A prosecutor may not parade the
details of the prior crime in front of the jury. The defendant is subject to
cross-examination only to test his veracity and credibility and thus collateral
matters should properly be limited to an effort to discredit him as a witness,
and not merely to prejudice the jury against the defendant. Care must be
taken to insure the defendant is not convicted for past rather than present
crimes.
Tucker, 800 P.2d at 822 (quotes, citations and notes omitted).
In Tucker, this court allowed cross-examination into the details of the prior
conviction because the defendant opened the door by attempting to minimize his
culpability. 800 P.2d at 823.
In State v. Colwell, by contrast, the defendant strictly limited his testimony on
direct exam to the prior convictions' nature, date and sentence. 2000 UT 8, ^f 31, 944
P.2d 177. On cross-examination, the prosecutor sought to extract details from the
defendant about those convictions. Id. Relying upon language from Tucker, the Court
emphasized that rule 609 impeachment is allowed only to challenge the "'defendant's
credibility as a witness.'" Id. at \ 34 (quoting Tucker, 800 P.2d at 822). In other words,
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while rule 609 impeachment may be employed to call into question the defendant's
credibility as a witness at trial, it may not be used as character evidence or "'merely to
prejudice the jury against the defendant.'" Id. (quoting Tucker at 822). Rule 609
impeachment is strictly limited because "'inquiry into the details of prior convictions
[has] been found to be so prejudicial as to amount to plain error.'" Id. at \ 33 (quoting
Tucker at 821).
In Colwell, the defendant was convicted for attempted aggravated murder when he
pulled a gun on an officer during a routine traffic stop. 2000 UT 8 atfflf1, 5. During the
defendant's cross-examination, the state attempted to go into details about prior
convictions for riot and theft, particularly that the defendant shot someone during those
crimes. Id. at ^ 31-32. The Court ruled that going into details about the prior
convictions was impermissible because while they may bear upon the defendant's
credibility as a witness, they could not be used to prove the defendant acted in conformity
therewith when he allegedly committed the more recent crime. Id. at *f 33. Evidence
about using a gun on prior occasions was inadmissible because it would show his
propensity for gun use on a later occasion: "We do not agree that the details of the
defendant's prior convictions are relevant to his state of mind at the time of the traffic
stop." Id?

5

Because the trial judge in Colwell sustained defense counsel's objection to the state's
first improper question and the defendant did not answer the second improper question,
the Court did "not find prejudicial error subject to reversal." Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at ^f 38.
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During direct examination in this case, the defendant testified as to the nature of
the prior conviction, as well as to the statement she made upon being confronted with the
drug from the patrol car. R. 119:193-94. She did not go into detail about either the
conviction or the statement; she did not attempt to explain away or attribute any special
meaning or significance to either:
Q. There's also been some testimony as you have heard in regards
to a forgery warrant. What can you tell us about that?
A. I pled guilty to a forgery that I committed and I took the
responsibility of that.
Q1. Do you remember having a conversation with Officer Malley in
regards to that?
A. Yes.
Q». You've testified that there were the topic of the forgery, correct?
[sic]
A. Yeah.
Q. Can you tell us during that conversation that you had with
Officer Malley, what you acknowledged or admitted that you're taking
responsibility for and what you did not acknowledge and take responsibility
for during that conversation?
A. I told Officer Malley that I did commit the forgery and that I
didn't have anything to do with the drugs that he found in his car.
[Questioning continued on a different topic]
R. 119:193-94.
Pursuant to rule 609, the state in this case could have questioned the defendant
about the conviction's date and sentence. See Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at ^f 37. Instead, the
prosecutor did not merely seek details, but rather read the entire forgery statute, thus
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leaving to the jury's imagination how many of the several ways to commit forgery and
victimize others the defendant may have utilized. R. 119:197.6 In response to defense
counsel's objection, the prosecutor claimed that the defendant "opened the door," and
justified delving into the forgery conviction by stating that "the term forgery is something
that I think is a bit amorphous." R. 119:197-98. The court overruled the objection,
authorizing the prosecutor to continue with these "questions," thereby also allowing the
prosecutor to elicit testimony specifically concerning dishonesty:
Q. And just so that I'm clear and (inaudible) forgery, real quick, so
forgery is something that somebody is guilty of, with the purpose to defraud
anyone or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by
anyone, he or she alters a writing of another without his authority or
authenticates, issues transfers, publishes or utters any writing so that the
writing or the making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance,
transference, publication or utterance purports to be the act of another,
whether the person is existent or non-existent, what purports to have been
executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than what's in
the (inaudible) case or to be a copy of an original when no such original
existed. That's what a forgery is, right?
Defense Counsel. And Your Honor, I'm going to make an objection
for the record at this time. I want to object on two grounds. First of all, on
relevance and also it's beyond the scope of my direct. Ms. Havatone is not
here today charged with forgery. We're here today just to discuss the sole
count of possession of an illegal substance.

6

Forcing the defendant to admit to violating any or all of the elements of forgery, without
any narrowing, causes the same mischief prohibited in Emrnett, supra. There, the
prosecutor crossed-examined the defendant about concocting a story. 839 P.2d at 78687. The prosecutor, however, possessed no evidence with which to 'prove up' the
allegation. Id. The Court condemned this practice because it "allow[s] the imaginative
and overzealous prosecutor to concoct a damaging line of examination which could leave
with the jury the impression that defendant was anything the question, by innuendo,
seemed to suggest." Id. at 787 n.18. In this case, the prosecutor planted the impression
that the defendant could have done anything or everything prohibited by the forgery
statute.
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The Court. Thank you. Any response?
Prosecutor. Just briefly, Judge. I believe the door was opened to
discussion along these lines. It was opened on direct. The term forgery is
something that I think is a bit amorphous and also a legal term. I think it's
important for everybody in the court to be clear so that we're all on the same
page in terms of what we're talking about.
The Court. I'll allow the witness to answer the questions to the
extent that she has knowledge of what the legal forgery is [sic].
Q. So those are the elements of the crime forgery as far as you know,
is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So this is a situation that involves someone's honesty, doesn't it?
A. Yes.
R. 119:197-98.
During the state's rebuttal argument, there occurred no attempt to relate the prior
convictiontothedefendanfs credibility as a witness at trial. See R. 119:241-42. Rather,
in contrast to the holding in Colwell, the prosecutor declared that because the defendant
was "lying" when she committed forgery, she "lied" yet again when she told the officer
that she had done forgery, but had nothing to do with drugs:
The defense would lead you to believe that because she admitted to the
forgery, what she was saying about the drugs was also true. That to me is
very strange, ladies and gentlemen, because she admits to lying about
something, having lied in the past and then wants you to believe that she's
not lying on that day. Don't be fooled by this. Don't be fooled.
R. 119:242. As noted in Point I, the prosecutor's subsequent use of impeachment
evidence as substantive character evidence constitutes plain error. See Emmett, 839 P.2d
at 786 n.15 (declaring that while proper impeachment evidence may have been elicited
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through cross-examination, the prosecutor went too far during closing argument by using
the impeachment evidence as substantive character evidence).
In sum, the prosecutor in this case violated rule 609 by seeking more than the
nature, date and sentence for forgery during the defendant's cross-examination. More
prejudicial than merely investigating details, the prosecutor recited each statutory element
of forgery and made the defendant admit that forgery involves dishonestly, thus leaving
to the jury's imagination how many types of forgery this untrustworthy person
committed. R. 119:197-98. The prosecutor used this testimony not to undermine the
defendant's testimony as a witness at trial, but rather to declare that because the
defendant had "lied in the past," the jury must conclude she was "lying" the day she
denied possessing drugs. R. 119:242. The trial court abused its discretion in overruling
the defendant's objection to this cross-examination.
POINT IV: THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT.
During the state's rebuttal argument, the prosecutor alleged that defense counsel
was trying to deceive the jury, he accused the defendant of passing bad checks when no
such evidence existed in the record, he stated his personal belief that the defendant was
"lying," and, most troublesome, he argued that because the defendant had been dishonest
in the past, she must have been lying when she denied possessing drugs.
An attorney enjoys "considerable latitude" to discuss the theory of a case during
closing argument, and may suggest reasonable deductions arising from the evidence that
supports the theory. State v. Larsen, 2005 UT App 201, If 9, 113 P.3d 998 (quoting State
v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, TJ 56, 979 P.2d 799). However, prosecutorial misconduct during
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closing argument requires reversal where (1) "the remarks call to the attention of jurors
matters which they could not properly consider in determining their verdict/5 and (2) the
remarks are prejudicial. Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at ]f 39. "If determined to be harmful,
improper statements will require reversal." Id.
The individual instances of prosecutorial misconduct are discussed below.
Common to each instance is the prosecutor's transformation of the forgery evidence into
impermissible substantive character evidence, arguing that because the forgery conviction
involved dishonesty, the defendant was "lying on that day" when she admitted
committing forgery but denied possessing the drugs. R. 119:242; compare Emmett, 839
P.2d at 786 n.15 (declaring that while bad act evidence may have been properly elicited
through cross-examination, plain error occurred when the prosecutor used this
impeachment evidence as substantive character evidence during closing argument).
A.

The Prosecutor Impermissibly Accused Defense Counsel of Misleading the
Jury,
A prosecutor's allegations that defense counsel has attempted to "becloud the

issue," or "deceive the jury" may constitute prosecutorial misconduct. See State v.
Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 854 (Utah App. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Gilman, 368 A.2d 253, 258 (1977)).
In this case, the prosecution not only disparaged defense counsel, but did so based
upon an argument that defense counsel never asserted. As detailed above, during direct
examination the defendant admitted to a prior forgery conviction, and also that she told
the officer who found the drugs in his patrol car that "I did commit the forgery and that I
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didn't have anything to do with the drugs that he found in his car." R. 119:194. This
testimony, however, came in only as the result of the prosecutor's pretrial motion to
admit it - over the defendant's objections. See R. 119:2-16, 96. The statement was
initially disclosed to the jury through the testimony of the arresting officer. R. 119:142
(quoting the defendant as stating, "I did a forgery but I don't do drugs, you can test me.").
During rebuttal, the prosecutor claimed the defendant was attempting to accredit
the drug denial by highlighting her candor in admitting forgery. R. 119:241-42. The
defendant, however, never made this argument. In fact, defense counsel described the
discovery of the drug and the defendant's response in closing argument without
mentioning forgery:
And last but not least, we've also heard testimony from both the officer and
Ms. Havatone indicating that upon being confronted with the incriminating
evidence, the drugs, Ms. Havatone said, it's not mine and I'm willing to take
a drug test for it. However, a drug test was never performed on her because
if she was doing that, chances are it would have shown up on the drug test.
R. 119:228.
Defense counsel's only argument regarding forgery was made in the context of
urging focus on the possession charge facing the defendant, not on the prior forgery
conviction:
Now there's testimony and at least when I started keeping count in Mr.
Nelson's closing arguments, at least the mention of the forgery was three
prior times. However, I would ask you to just stay focused on the facts of
this case. This is what we have to present to you. You could accept it or
you could reject it; however, I would ask that you focus on, as you
deliberate, whether or not she was in possession of the methamphetamine.
This is not a case about forgery and besides the fact that Mr. Nelson took
out his book, his law book and read to you the definition of forgery, this is
not what this case is about.
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R. 119:238-39. Defense counsel, however, did not argue that because the defendant took
responsibility for the forgery, her denial of possessing drugs was more credible. See id.
Yet in closing argument, the prosecutor attributed precisely this argument to the
defendant, and then declared the argument was intended to mislead the jury:
I want to talk to you about the conflicts of the evidence today because you
heard from one person from the prosecution's side and one person from the
defense's side and the defense in his closing argument made a pretty big
deal about the fact that the defendant had been convicted of forgery, wanted
to bring that to your attention and make sure that you're clear on the fact
that there's no forgery charge today. Why do you think that is, ladies and
gentlemen? Think about that for a second. Why was he so insistent about
that? I'll tell you why, he wants to divert your attention away from the fact
that the defendant has a conviction for lying, for dishonesty, for forgery,
passing bad checks. You heard the definition of what a forgery is. . . . The
defense would lead you to believe that because she admitted to the forgery,
what she was saying about the drugs was also true. That to me is very
strange, ladies and gentlemen, because she admits to lying about something,
having lied in the past and then wants you to believe that she's not lying on
that day. Don't be fooled by this. Don't be fooled.
R. 119:241-42 (emphasis added).
The prosecutor committed misconduct by urging consideration of defense
counsel's integrity.
B.

The Prosecutor Accused the Defendant of "Passing Bad Checks" Even
Though No Such Evidence Was Presented at Trial.
The prosecutor delved into the statutory definition of forgery during the

defendant's cross-examination, yet never asked about which of the many ways of
committing forgery, per section 76-6-501(a), the defendant engaged in. R. 119:197-98.
No mention of passing bad checks came in through the testimony of the officer or the
defendant.
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Then, during rebuttal argument suggesting that defense counsel was seeking to
mislead the jury, the prosecutor accused the defendant of passing bad checks: "I'll tell
you why [defense counsel urged focus on the possession charge rather than the prior
forgery conviction], he wants to divert your attention away from the fact that the
defendant has a conviction for lying, for dishonesty, for forgery, passing bad checks" R.
119:242 (emphasis added).
The prosecutor committed misconduct by accusing the defendant of committing a
criminal act of which the record contains no evidence.
C.

The Prosecutor Voiced His Personal Opinion that the Defendant Lied When
She Denied Drug Possession.
"[A] prosecutor engages in misconduct when he or she asserts personal knowledge

of the facts in issue or expresses personal opinion, being ca form of unsworn, unchecked
testimony which tends to exploit the influence of the prosecutor's office and undermine
the objective detachment that should separate a lawyer from the cause being argued."5
State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d
1239, 1255-56 (Utah 1988); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, § 3-5.8 (2d ed. 1980)).
During rebuttal in this case, as noted above, the prosecutor attributed to defense
counsel an argument never made in which the candor shown in admitting forgery was
used to accredit the drug denial. R. 119:242. In rebutting this supposed argument, the
prosecutor asserts his personal believe that the argument is "very strange" and, in fact,
because the defendant had previously "lied" she was "lying" when she denied drug use:
The defense would lead you to believe that because she admitted to the
forgery, what she was saying about the drugs was also true. That to me is
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very strange, ladies and gentlemen, because she admits to lying about
something, having lied in the past and then wants you to believe that she's
not lying on that day.
R. 119:242 (emphasis added).
Misconduct occurred when the prosecutor stated his personal belief that the
defendant was "lying" when she denied drug possession.
D.

The Prosecutor Urged Consideration of Inadmissible Character Evidence,
The most troublesome aspect of the prosecution's argument was his express

appeal to inadmissible character evidence. Prosecutorial misconduct occurs "if the
actions or remarks of counsel call to the attention of the jury a matter it would not be
justified in determining its verdict[.]" State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284 (Utah
1989). Rule 404 forbids evidence of bad acts introduced to show conformity therewith
on another occasion. Thus, a jury is not justified in considering such evidence. See State
v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, ^f 14, 108 P.3d 730 (considering but rejecting claim of prosecutorial
misconduct based upon improper argument regarding former crimes on grounds not
relevant herein); State v. Devey, 2006 UT App 219,ffif13-14, 138 P.3d 90 (same).
As noted supra, Points I and III, the court erred in admitting the defendant's
comment about committing forgery because it was irrelevant bad act evidence offered to
impugn the defendant's character. The prosecutor used the comment to "prove the
character of [the defendant] in order to show action in conformity therewith." Utah R.
Evid. 404(b). He effectively accused the defendant of "lying" when she denied
possessing drugs because forgery is a crime of dishonesty:
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The defense would lead you to believe that because she admitted to the
forgery, what she was saying about the drugs was also true. That to me is
very strange, ladies and gentlemen, because she admits to lying about
something, having lied in the past and then wants you to believe that she's
not lying on that day.
R. 119:241-42 (emphasis added).
The jury received one clear message: The defendant lied in the past, so she lied
when confronted with the drugs. This argument beseeches the jury to consider irrelevant
and inadmissible character evidence. See Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786 n.15. This constitutes
misconduct.

POINT V: TAKEN ALONE OR TOGETHER THE ERRORS DETAILED
ABOVE CAUSED HARM.
Determining the harm caused by the errors detailed above requires that they be
considered in the context of the evidence and arguments at trial. E.g.,Larsen, 2005 UT
App 201 at U 5; see Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at If 37 (violation of rule 609 harmless where
defendant's objection was sustained, questioning was suspended, and cautionary
instruction was given).
Harm sufficient to require reversal occurs unless "it is 'sufficiently
inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected
the outcome of proceedings.'" See, e.g., Rhinehart, 2006 UT App 517 at *f 28 (quoting
Loose, 2000 UT 11 at Tf 10 n.l). Under the plain error doctrine, reversal is required
where the evidentiary error was "obviously improper and harmful and that [the] failure to
object did not lead the court into error." Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785. In this case, the errors
and consequent harm meet either standard. Especially when considered cumulatively, the
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errors herein undermine confidence that the defendant received a fair trial. See State v.
Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), citing State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,
124 &n.l5 (Utah 1989).
In Emmett, the state during closing argument impermissibly transformed
impeachment evidence into substantive character evidence. 839 P.2d at 786 & n.15. In
considering whether the error was harmful under the more deferential plain error
standard, the Court noted that, indeed, there existed sufficient evidence in the record to
support a conviction. Id. at 786. The Court, however, observed that "[i]n close cases, the
substantive use of a prior conviction can often tilt the balance in favor of conviction[.]"
Id. It held that, especially when considered with other errors, "[T]here is a reasonable
likelihood that absent the errors a different result would have occurred.... [W]e
conclude that the error was of sufficient magnitude as to warrant a new trial." Id.
The evidence in this case was very close. No direct evidence existed that the
defendant possessed the drugs. R. 119:214-15. The officer allowed the defendant to
change her clothes - outside his presence, then cuffed her in back, pat-searched her and
her coat, and belted her in the right side of the patrol car. Supra, Statement of Facts, "The
evidence in general." After the defendant stepped out of the car, the officer found a small
amount of methamphetamine - located not toward the right side of the backseat, but
rather right in the middle, amid other "foliage" and "debris." Id. The officer asserted he
always checks the rear seat after transporting prisoners, therefore the drug must have
belonged to the defendant. Id. The defendant countered that while she may have
committed forgery, she did not do drugs and, in fact, she requested a drug test. Id.
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Combined with the closeness of the evidence are the several errors: Admission of
the irrelevant, prejudicial forgery statement; allowing equally irrelevant testimony that the
defendant was initially arrested for forgery; permitting improper cross-examination
regarding the forgery conviction; and especially the argument based upon very prejudicial
character evidence during rebuttal. Given the foregoing, especially when considered
cummulatively, the errors may not be labeled as harmless.
CONCLUSION
The defendant's conviction should be vacated and a new trial granted.
DATED this<£_ day of June, 2007.

JOHN PACE
PATRICK S. TAN
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 061900841 FS

KIMBERLY SHEA HAVATONE,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

ANN BOYDEN
February 5, 2007

PRESENT
Clerk:
patd
Prosecutor: NELSON, STEPHEN L
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): TAN, PATRICK S
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: December 12, 1974
Video
Tape Count: 94 02 7
CHARGES
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 12/05/2006 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in
the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.

Panp

1

Case No: 061900841
Date:
Feb 05, 2007

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
RUN CONSECTIVELY WITH ANY OTHER SENTENCE
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 60 day(s) in the Salt Lake County Jail.
Attorney Fees
Amount: $500.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: S L LEGAL DEFENDERS S L COUNTY ATTORNEY
SENTENCE TRUST NOTE
PAYMENTS PER AP&P
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month (s) .
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant to serve 60 day(s) jail.
Defendant is to report to the Salt Lake County Jail.
Defendant is to report by February 7, 2007 by 9 a.m..
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any
Law Enforcement Officer.
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or
illegal drugs.
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law
Enforcement Officer.
Violate no laws.
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole.
Paae 2

Case No: 061900841
Date:
Feb 05, 2007
Submit to drug testing.
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise
distributed illegally.
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
COMPLY WITH ALL A/D CLAUSES PER AP&P, COMPLETE ANY ADDITIONAL
TREATMENT PER AP&P
SENTENCE PROBATION SERVICE NOTE
RUN CONCURRENTLY WITH ANY OTHER SENTENCE, DEFT TO BE IN FULL
COMPLIANCE WITH PROBATION OR SERVE PRISON SENTENCE
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§ 58-37-8. Prohibited acts-Penalties

(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and
intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, manufacture,
or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange
to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any violation
of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 58,
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert
with five or more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position of
organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance analog, or
gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a second degree felony
and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third degree
felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree felony;
or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a
second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may
be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the
trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 76- 10-501 was used, carried, or
possessed on his person or in his immediate possession during the commission or in
furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may
additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five
years to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree
felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than seven years
and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended,
and the person is not eligible for probation.

(2) Prohibited acts B--Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance
analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or
order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice,
or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement,
vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be
occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in
any of those locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged
prescription or written order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more than 16
ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third
degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part of
the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a
class A misdemeanor.
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent to a
conviction under Subsection (l)(a), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater
penalty than provided in this Subsection (2).
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled
substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than one ounce
of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is
guilty of a third degree felony.
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior
boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-131 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one
degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect to
controlled substances as listed in:
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate
term as provided by law, and:
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of one year to run
consecutively and not concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate
term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to
a term of six months to run consecutively and not concurrently.

(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony.
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an offense not
amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207:
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in his body any
measurable amount of a controlled substance; and
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent manner,
causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death of another.
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in his body:
(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those described in
Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or a controlled substance classified under Schedule II is guilty of a
second degree felony;
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in Subsection 58-374(2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA) is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or V is guilty of a class
A misdemeanor.
(3) Prohibited acts C-Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a
license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, for
the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent
himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or
other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the administration
of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be
attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure the administration of any
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception,
subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the
use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance,
or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued or written under
the terms of this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed to
print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint,
or device of another or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree felony.

(4) Prohibited acts D-Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this
chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter
37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled
Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under this
Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of those
schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds
of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which
are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or
institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10- 501;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse,
or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in Subsections
(4)(a)(i) through (viii);
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of
where the act occurs; or
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, or
distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an inmate or on the grounds of
any correctional facility as defined in Section 76-8-311.3.
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony and
shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would
otherwise have been established but for this subsection would have been a first degree
felony. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is
not eligible for probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been less
than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under this
Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that
offense. This Subsection (4)(c) does not apply to a violation of Subsection (2)(g).
(d)(i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi):
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided
by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and

(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who, acting with
the mental state required for the commission of an offense, directly or indirectly solicits,
requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to commit
a violation of Subsection (4)(a)(xi).
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly
believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was
unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the
location where the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware
that the location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B
misdemeanor.
(6)(a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu
of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state,
conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a
bar to prosecution in this state.
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a
person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a
controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did
so with knowledge of the character of the substance or substances.
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of his
professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or
administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by
an assistant or orderly under his direction and supervision.
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or possesses
an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a
registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of his
employment.
(10)(a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any Indian, as
defined in Subsection 58-37-2(l)(v), who uses, possesses, or transports peyote for bona
fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian
religion as defined in Subsection 58- 37-2(l)(w).

(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as defined in
Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(V), it is an affirmative defense that the peyote was used,
possessed, or transported by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in
connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion.
(c)(i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an affirmative defense
under this Subsection (10) as soon as practicable, but not later than ten days prior to trial.
(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense.
(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice for good cause
shown, if the prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack of timely notice.
(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this Subsection (10) by a
preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is established, it is a complete defense to
the charges.
(11) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without
the invalid provision or application.
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RULE 402. RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY ADMISSIBLE;
IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of
the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by
other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.

RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.

RULE 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE
CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of character of
the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted under Rule
404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered by the
prosecution;
(2) Character of Alleged Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first
aggressor;
(3) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules
607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
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opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to
introduce at trial.

RULE 609. IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF CONVICTION OF CRIME
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence
that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
(b) Time Limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of
more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the
witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date,
unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the
conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its
prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as
calculated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party
sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence.
(c) Effect of Pardon, Annulment, or Certificate of Rehabilitation. Evidence of a
conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the subject of a
pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a
finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that person has not been
convicted of a subsequent crime which was punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or
other equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence.
(d) Juvenile Adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not
admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of
a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction of the offense
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would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that
admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or
innocence.
(e) Pendency of Appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render evidence
of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible.

